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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Some 26 years ago in a small town located in western 
Tennessee, Danny Vine and Della Thornton were murdered.  
Vine’s home-based business was robbed and burned down 
with his and Thornton’s bodies inside.  Not long after, state and 
local law enforcement began to suspect Charles Gary Bruce 
and three others.  Federal authorities later became involved, 
leading to Bruce’s 1996 conviction for various federal crimes, 
including two counts of witness tampering murder for killing 
Vine and Thornton.  For his wrongdoing, Bruce received a 
sentence of life without parole plus ten years in prison. 
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court handed down 
Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), a decision that 
interpreted the statute under which Bruce was convicted.  That 
statute makes it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to . 
. . prevent the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer . . . of the United States . . . of information 
relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense.”  
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).  Fowler addressed situations like 
Bruce’s, where the defendant killed a person with the intent to 
prevent communication with law enforcement officers in 
general but did not have federal officers in mind at the time of 
the offense.  In light of Fowler, Bruce now claims that he was 
convicted of conduct that is not a crime under the statute. 
Ordinarily, federal prisoners collaterally challenging 
their convictions or sentences must seek relief pursuant to the 
remedial framework set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  But Bruce 
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never pursued his current statutory interpretation argument on 
direct appeal or in his initial § 2255 motion.  And § 2255(h) 
does not permit a second bite at the habeas apple for previously 
unavailable rules of statutory interpretation.  Bruce instead 
invokes § 2255’s saving clause, which allows a federal 
prisoner to seek a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
when § 2255’s remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention.”  § 2255(e). 
The District Court read our Circuit precedent as 
permitting Bruce to pass through the saving clause to § 2241, 
but declined to grant the writ.  We hold that the District Court 
properly exercised jurisdiction under § 2241.  And after careful 
review of the record, we also conclude that this is not the 
extraordinary case in which a successful showing of actual 
innocence has been made.  The judgment of the District Court 
will therefore be affirmed.   
I 
A 
In December 1990, Charles Gary Bruce (Gary Bruce or 
Bruce) was experiencing financial difficulty.  Together with 
his brothers Jerry and Robert, Gary Bruce devised a scheme to 
rob a mussel shell camp in Camden, Tennessee operated by 
Danny Vine.  The Bruces believed that Vine, a local mussel 
shell buyer, carried large amounts of cash and that his camp, 
being secluded in the woods, would be easy to rob.   
Camden is located in Benton County, not far from the 
Kentucky Lake, a large artificial reservoir created by the 
impounding of the Tennessee River by the Kentucky Dam.  
During the 1990s, the harvesting, processing, and exportation 
of freshwater mussel shells was a thriving industry in 
Tennessee.  Divers would take the shells from the Kentucky 
Lake or the Tennessee River and sell them to local buyers like 
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Vine, who served as purchasing agents for large companies.  
The buyers then transported their shells to the company for 
which they worked, where the meat was removed and the shells 
shipped overseas, most often to Japan.  There, producers used 
the white lining of the mussel shells to manufacture cultured 
pearls. 
On January 15, 1991, joined by their friend David 
Riales, the Bruces agreed that they would rob Vine’s camp.  
They decided to kill anyone who was there and do whatever it 
took to take the shells.  The following day, the group purchased 
several cans of gasoline from a local gas station and carried out 
their plan.  When they arrived, Vine was present at the camp 
with his fiancée, Della Thornton, and their puppy.  Gary Bruce 
tied up Vine and Thornton, who were both shot in the head at 
point-blank range with Gary’s gun—Gary shot Vine, and Jerry 
shot Thornton.  The group then poured gasoline on Vine and 
Thornton’s bodies and throughout the house.  Finally, they set 
the house ablaze and drove away with Vine’s truck full of 
mussel shells. 
Vine, Thornton, and their puppy’s charred remains were 
discovered by the local sheriff’s department three days later.  
Special Agent Alvin Daniel of the Tennessee Bureau of 
Investigation (TBI) was then assigned to the case.  Through 
forensic evidence, state and local authorities identified Vine 
and Thornton as the victims and determined that the two had 
been shot in the head prior to the fire.  The state fire marshal 
concluded that gasoline was used to set fire to the house and 
burn the bodies.  Beyond that, investigators had limited 
physical evidence and no leads.   
A few weeks after the murders, investigators learned of 
several suspicious sales of mussel shells by Gary Bruce’s wife 
and brothers.  At that point the Bruces became suspects.  
Ballistics testing, including a search warrant to recover bullets 
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fired into a tree on Gary Bruce’s property, led Special Agent 
Daniel to determine that Bruce’s gun was used to shoot Vine 
and Thornton.  The investigation became drawn out, however, 
by the unwillingness of witnesses to speak to state and local 
law enforcement. 
Eventually Daniel approached the local United States 
Attorney’s Office for assistance.  A federal grand jury 
investigation commenced to hear testimony from witnesses, 
several of whom later indicated that their fear of the Bruces 
prevented them from cooperating prior to the involvement of 
federal authorities.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
also became involved. 
B 
On November 1, 1993, a grand jury sitting in the 
Western District of Tennessee issued an indictment charging 
Gary, Jerry, and Robert Bruce, as well as David Riales, each 
with two counts of witness tampering murder, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).  The eight-count indictment also 
included charges of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit 
Hobbs Act robbery, use of a firearm to commit robbery and 
murder, arson, use of fire to commit robbery and murder, and 
conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Kathleen Bruce, the mother of 
the Bruce brothers, was also charged with conspiracy to 
obstruct justice, in addition to facing separate counts of lying 
to a grand jury and witness tampering by threat or intimidation. 
Gary Bruce was detained at the McNary County, 
Tennessee jail pending trial.  He escaped on July 27, 1994, and 
remained at large for 14 months.  While a fugitive, a jury 
convicted Bruce’s codefendants on all counts, except that 
Kathleen Bruce was acquitted of her witness tampering charge.  
The Sixth Circuit affirmed their convictions, United States v. 
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Bruce, 100 F.3d 957, 1996 WL 640468 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996) 
(unpublished table decision), and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, 520 U.S. 1128 (1997).  
Gary Bruce’s trial commenced on July 29, 1996.  As to 
the witness tampering murder counts, the district court 
instructed the jury that, to convict, it must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that Bruce killed another person, (2) with 
the intent to prevent the communication of information to a law 
enforcement officer, and (3) that the information related to the 
commission of a federal crime.  J.A. 1004-05.  No instruction 
was given that the potential communication of information 
needed to be to a federal law enforcement officer.  The jury 
convicted Bruce on all counts, including a separately-indicted 
charge of escape.  The district court sentenced Bruce to life 
without parole, plus another ten years for his pre-trial escape.  
The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bruce’s convictions, United States 
v. Bruce, 142 F.3d 437, 1998 WL 165144 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 
1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, 525 U.S. 882 (1998). 
Since his convictions became final, Bruce has 
unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief several times, 
proceeding pro se throughout.  In June 2008, Bruce filed a 
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee.  That court denied 
the motion.  Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit denied 
a certificate of appealability.  In 2012 and 2013, Bruce sought 
authorization to file second or successive § 2255 motions, but 
the Sixth Circuit denied those requests.  It was not until the 
2013 motion that Bruce invoked Fowler v. United States, 563 
U.S. 668 (2011).  In denying the 2013 motion, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that Bruce failed to satisfy § 2255(h)’s limitations on 
second or successive motions because Fowler created a rule of 
statutory interpretation, not constitutional law, and has not 
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been held by the Supreme Court to apply retroactively in cases 
on collateral review.  In re Bruce, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25436, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2013). 
II 
On September 12, 2013, Bruce filed a pro se petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
the district of his confinement.  Citing Fowler, Bruce 
contended that he is actually innocent of his two convictions 
for witness tampering murder.   
The Magistrate Judge initially recommended that 
Bruce’s petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to his 
failure to satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(e)’s saving clause.  The following day, however, this 
Court decided United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 
2013), which permitted a prisoner who had filed successive § 
2255 motions to pursue a Fowler-based actual innocence claim 
under § 2241.  In the wake of Tyler, the District Court declined 
to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings. 
On remand, the Magistrate Judge found that jurisdiction 
under § 2241 was proper, but recommended that Bruce’s 
petition be denied.  Bruce v. Thomas, 2014 WL 5242407 (M.D. 
Pa. June 20, 2014).  The Magistrate Judge concluded that 
Bruce had failed to show that it was more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted him of witness 
tampering murder based on Fowler’s interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).  Id. at *10.  The District Court adopted 
the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation in its 
entirety and denied Bruce’s petition.  Bruce v. Thomas, 2014 
WL 5242409 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2014).   
Still proceeding pro se, Bruce timely filed a notice of 
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appeal.  The requirements for obtaining a certificate of 
appealability set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) do not apply to 
prisoners appealing the denial of a § 2241 petition.  See United 
States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 
U.S. 134 (2012); Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  We appointed Thomas S. Jones and Rajeev 
Muttreja of Jones Day to represent Bruce on appeal.  The Court 
thanks Messrs. Jones and Muttreja for accepting this matter pro 
bono and for their well-stated arguments.  Attorneys who act 
pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the bar can 
offer to indigent parties and to the legal profession. 
III 
It is appropriate to begin by addressing whether the 
District Court properly entertained Bruce’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Even though the 
Government agrees with Bruce that he may seek the writ, 
“every federal appellate court has a special obligation to 
‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review,’ even though the 
parties are prepared to concede it.”  Bender v. Williamsport 
Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting Mitchell 
v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); see Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).  That duty 
is especially pertinent in this case, there being an entrenched 
split among the courts of appeals regarding the extent to which 
a change in statutory interpretation permits a federal prisoner 
to resort to § 2241 for an additional round of collateral review. 
A 
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has 
authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to 
federal prisoners.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 
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82.  The Reconstruction Congress later expanded the scope of 
the writ to reach state prisoners as well.  Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 
ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.  That guarantee can be found in its 
current form at § 2241 of the Judicial Code, which provides 
that federal judges may grant the writ of habeas corpus on the 
application of a prisoner held “in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  The prisoner must direct his petition to 
“the person who has custody over him.”  § 2242; see also 
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885); Braden v. 30th 
Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973).   
Longstanding practice under this immediate custodian rule 
“confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical 
confinement . . . the default rule is that the proper respondent 
is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.”  
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004).  And under the 
statute’s jurisdiction of confinement rule, district courts may 
only grant habeas relief against custodians “within their 
respective jurisdictions.”  § 2241(a); see also Braden, 410 U.S. 
at 495 (“[T]he language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more 
than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the 
custodian.”). 
An increase in the number of federal habeas petitions 
produced serious administrative problems and overburdened 
the few district courts in the jurisdictions with major federal 
prisons.  See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 
(1952).  Congress responded in 1948 by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967-68.  A new 
remedial mechanism, § 2255 “replaced traditional habeas 
corpus for federal prisoners (at least in the first instance) with 
a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the 
sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was, inter alia, 
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
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States.”  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The statute’s “sole purpose 
was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus 
hearings by affording the same rights in another and more 
convenient forum.”  Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219; see also Hill v. 
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 428 n.5 (1962) (describing 
the § 2255 remedy as “exactly commensurate” with § 2241’s 
writ of habeas corpus); United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 
314 (3d Cir. 1953).     
So it is that a federal prisoner’s first (and most often 
only) route for collateral review of his conviction or sentence 
is under § 2255.  Indeed, § 2255 provides that a habeas petition 
filed in the prisoner’s district of confinement “shall not be 
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply 
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that 
such court has denied him relief.”  § 2255(e) (emphasis added).  
But to this limitation, Congress also provided a saving clause: 
a federal prisoner may resort to § 2241 only if he can establish 
that “the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”  Id.; see also 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (discussing § 2255’s “saving 
clause”).  See generally Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary 
of Legal Usage 797 (3d ed. 2011) (“[S]aving is the precise 
word” for “a statutory provision exempting from coverage 
something that would otherwise be included”). 
With the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214, Congress added significant gatekeeping 
provisions to § 2255, while at the same time leaving the 
statute’s saving clause untouched.  Under AEDPA, a federal 
prisoner may only file a second or successive motion under § 
2255 on the basis of “newly discovered evidence” or “a new 
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
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collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.”  § 2255(h).  No exception exists for new non-
constitutional rules, even if that rule was previously 
unavailable and applies retroactively in cases on collateral 
review.  By omitting such an exception, “Congress seems to 
have lost sight of the fact that federal convicts more often can 
raise federal statutory claims in their collateral attacks—
notably in cases in which the federal criminal statute under 
which a prisoner was convicted has since been authoritatively 
interpreted more narrowly.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. 
Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1362 
(7th ed. 2015). 
We first addressed that scenario one year after 
AEDPA’s enactment.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 
1997), involved a prisoner convicted of using a firearm during 
the commission of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  After Ocsulis Dorsainvil’s initial § 2255 
motion, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137 (1995).  Bailey held as a matter of statutory 
interpretation that § 924(c)(1)’s “use” prong reaches only 
“active employment of the firearm” as opposed to mere 
possession.  Id. at 144.  Dorsainvil then asked this Court for 
permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, 
arguing that Bailey rendered noncriminal the conduct for 
which he was convicted.  Because Bailey was a new statutory 
rule, not a new constitutional one, we denied Dorsainvil’s 
request.  Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248.    
Dorsainvil argued in the alternative, however, that if 
AEDPA prevented him from pursuing his Bailey argument, 
then he should be able to resort to the writ of habeas corpus 
under § 2241.  We agreed.  “Were no other avenue of judicial 
review available for a party who claims that s/he is factually or 
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legally innocent as a result of a previously unavailable 
statutory interpretation,” the Court observed that it “would be 
faced with a thorny constitutional issue.”  Id.  We accordingly 
concluded that it would be a “complete miscarriage of justice 
to punish a defendant for an act that the law does not make 
criminal,” thus rendering § 2255 “‘inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of [Dorsainvil’s] detention.’”  Id. at 251 
(brackets in original; quoting § 2255(e)).  And so the Court 
held that in the unusual situation where an intervening change 
in statutory interpretation runs the risk that an individual was 
convicted of conduct that is not a crime, and that change in the 
law applies retroactively in cases on collateral review, he may 
seek another round of post-conviction review under § 2241.  Id. 
The issue we confronted in Dorsainvil has since been 
addressed by every regional circuit.  Nine of our sister circuits 
agree, though based on widely divergent rationales, that the 
saving clause permits a prisoner to challenge his detention 
when a change in statutory interpretation raises the potential 
that he was convicted of conduct that the law does not make 
criminal.  See Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 99 (1st 
Cir. 2008); Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 
2003); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903-04 (5th 
Cir. 2001); Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307-08 (6th Cir. 
2012); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 
2013); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 963-64 (8th Cir. 
2004); Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); 
In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  Two circuits see 
things differently, holding that an intervening change in 
statutory interpretation cannot render § 2255 inadequate or 
ineffective.  See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.); McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill 
Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 
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2017) (en banc), petition for cert. filed sub nom. McCarthan v. 
Collins, No. 17-85 (U.S. July 12, 2017). 
Even within the circuits that permit actual innocence 
claims based on changes in statutory interpretation, there is a 
deep divide as to when § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective in 
this context.  That split is illustrated by the present case.  As 
will be explained, this Court concludes that the saving clause 
requires that Gary Bruce be permitted to resort to § 2241 for 
another round of collateral review.  But Robert Bruce—who, 
like his brother, was convicted of federal witness tampering 
murder for killing Danny Vine and Della Thornton, and 
sentenced to life without parole—could not.  See Bruce v. 
Warden, 658 F. App’x 935 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), cert. 
denied sub nom. Bruce v. Drew, 137 S. Ct. 683 (2017).  Before 
the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision earlier this year in 
McCarthan, that court’s precedent held that the saving clause 
allows prisoners to assert actual innocence claims under § 2241 
based on a retroactive change in statutory law, but only if 
applicable circuit precedent foreclosed such an argument at the 
time of the prisoner’s direct appeal and initial § 2255 motion.  
See Zelaya v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 798 F.3d 1260, 1371 
(11th Cir. 2015).  Because Sixth Circuit precedent did not 
foreclose the kind of argument later accepted by the Supreme 
Court in Fowler until years after Robert Bruce’s first § 2255 
motion in 1998, see United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 
579-82 (6th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his actual 
innocence claim under § 2241, see 658 F. App’x at 939.   
This Court’s precedent does not contain a similar 
limitation.  Our Circuit permits access to § 2241 when two 
conditions are satisfied: First, a prisoner must assert a “claim 
of ‘actual innocence’ on the theory that ‘he is being detained 
for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal 
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by an intervening Supreme Court decision’ and our own 
precedent construing an intervening Supreme Court 
decision”—in other words, when there is a change in statutory 
caselaw that applies retroactively in cases on collateral review.   
Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246 (quoting Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252).  
And second, the prisoner must be “otherwise barred from 
challenging the legality of the conviction under § 2255.”  Id.  
Stated differently, the prisoner has “had no earlier opportunity 
to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening 
change in substantive law may negate.”  Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
at 251.  It matters not whether the prisoner’s claim was viable 
under circuit precedent as it existed at the time of his direct 
appeal and initial § 2255 motion.  What matters is that the 
prisoner has had no earlier opportunity to test the legality of his 
detention since the intervening Supreme Court decision issued. 
While differences in the law amongst the circuits is a 
feature, not a bug, of our federal judicial system, the disparate 
treatment of Gary and Robert Bruce should not be overlooked.  
When it comes to their actual innocence claims, the two Bruce 
brothers are similarly situated in all respects but one: they are 
incarcerated in federal prisons located in different circuits.  Yet 
as already noted, by enacting § 2255 Congress sought to 
alleviate the inefficiencies that attend § 2241’s immediate 
custodian and district of confinement rules.  Now those 
difficulties have returned, though in a new form.  And so they 
will remain, at least until Congress or the Supreme Court 
speaks on the matter.  
B 
Against this background, we now consider whether the 
District Court properly exercised jurisdiction under § 2241. 
The witness tampering murder statute prohibits the 
“kill[ing] or attempt[ed] kill[ing]” of “another person, with 
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intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible commission 
of a Federal offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).  With regard 
to the defendant’s intent, a related subsection of the statute 
provides that “no state of mind need be proved with respect to 
the circumstance . . . that the law enforcement officer is an 
officer or employee of the Federal Government.”  § 1512(g)(2).   
As this Court recognized in Tyler, the Supreme Court’s 
Fowler decision interpreted the witness tampering murder 
statute in a manner that gave the statute a narrower reach than 
that previously permitted by our Circuit precedent.  732 F.3d 
at 251-52.  Prior to Fowler, this Court held that § 1512(a)(1)(C) 
requires the Government to prove that “the officers with whom 
the defendant believed the victim might communicate would in 
fact be federal officers.”  United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 
1349 (3d Cir. 1997).  And as already noted, the jury at Bruce’s 
trial in the Western District of Tennessee was instructed under 
an even more lenient standard: no instruction was given that 
the victim might communicate with a federal officer.  Fowler 
adopted a different approach: the Government must now prove 
that it was “reasonably likely under the circumstances that (in 
the absence of the killing) at least one of the relevant 
communications would have been made to a federal officer.”  
563 U.S. at 677-78 (emphasis added).  Because Bruce was 
convicted under a lesser standard than that required by Fowler, 
there stands a chance that he is incarcerated for conduct that 
does not constitute a crime.  As this change in the law did not 
occur until 2011—long after Bruce’s convictions became final, 
and months after the denial of his initial § 2255 motion—he 
had no earlier opportunity to test of legality of his detention 
under Fowler. 
We further conclude that the change in the law brought 
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about by Fowler applies retroactively in cases on collateral 
review.  The established framework for determining the 
retroactive effect of new rules was set forth in the plurality 
opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  That 
framework applies as much in a federal collateral challenge to 
a federal conviction as it does in a federal collateral challenge 
to a state conviction.  United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210, 213 
(3d Cir. 2014).  But cf. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 
1264 (2016) (assuming without deciding that Teague applies 
to federal collateral review of federal convictions).  Teague 
concluded that, as a general matter, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to convictions 
that are already final.  Two categories of new rules fall outside 
this general bar.  First are “[n]ew substantive rules.”  Schriro 
v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004); see Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 307, 311.  Second are “new watershed rules of criminal 
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy 
of the criminal proceeding.”  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 
495 (1990); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13. 
It is quite clear that the rule set forth in Fowler is new.  
“A case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction 
became final.”  Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.  It is equally clear that 
the rule announced in Fowler is a substantive one.  “A rule is 
substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of 
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”  Schriro, 
542 U.S. at 353.  “This includes decisions that narrow the scope 
of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as 
constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or 
persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to 
punish.”  Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted).  In such 
circumstances, “where the conviction or sentence is not in fact 
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authorized by substantive law, then finality interests are at their 
weakest.”  Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1266.  By interpreting the 
witness tampering murder statute, Fowler narrowed its scope.  
Fowler therefore announced a new rule of substantive law that 
applies retroactively in cases on collateral review.  Accord 
United States v. Smith, 723 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2013). 
The constitutional foundation for the retroactive 
application of new substantive rules lends further support to 
Dorsainvil’s interpretation of § 2255’s saving clause.  
Decisions of the Supreme Court “holding that a substantive 
federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct . . . 
necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands 
convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make criminal.’”  
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (quoting 
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)); see also 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 250-51.  And because it is a first 
principle of the separation of powers that “it is only Congress, 
and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal,” 
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21; see United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), a court is “prohibited from 
imposing criminal punishment beyond what Congress in fact 
has enacted by a valid law.”  Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268.  It is 
for these reasons that “Teague’s conclusion establishing the 
retroactivity of new substantive rules is best understood as 
resting upon constitutional premises.”  Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016).   
In light of these principles, the significant constitutional 
concerns we expressed in Dorsainvil are manifest.  The 
Constitution dictates that “[a] conviction and sentence imposed 
in violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous but 
contrary to law and, as a result, void.”  Id. at 731 (citing Ex 
parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880)).  “It follows, as a 
general principle, that a court has no authority to leave in place 
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a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, 
regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became final 
before the rule was announced.”  Id.  Of signal importance, it 
is “uncontroversial . . . that the privilege of habeas corpus 
entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous 
application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”  Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 
(2001)).  Foreclosing a prisoner from even having an 
opportunity to assert his actual innocence in light of an 
intervening Supreme Court decision announcing a new 
substantive rule would challenge one of the writ’s core 
guarantees.  Thus, as we concluded in Dorsainvil and reaffirm 
today, for a prisoner in those circumstances § 2255’s remedy 
is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention.”  § 2255(e).    
We therefore hold that the District Court properly 
exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Past decisions 
of this Court permitting a prisoner to pass through the saving 
clause to assert an actual innocence claim have sent the case 
back to the district court to consider the merits of that claim in 
the first instance.  Our prior cases confronted only a threshold 
jurisdictional determination, however; the district courts in 
those cases did not reached the merits of the underlying claims.  
In Dorsainvil we denied the prisoner’s motion for a second or 
successive § 2255 motion without prejudice to his proceeding 
under § 2241.  119 F.3d at 252.  And in Tyler we remanded the 
matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the 
prisoner’s actual innocence claims.  732 F.3d at 246-47, 252-
53.  The present case arrives in a different posture.  Here the 
District Court, in accord with our Circuit precedent, concluded 
that it had jurisdiction under § 2241 and rejected Bruce’s 
Fowler-based actual innocence claim. 
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C 
Having assured ourselves of the District Court’s 
jurisdiction, we shall proceed to consider the merits of this 
appeal.  We have jurisdiction to do so under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253(a).  As no evidentiary hearing was held below, we 
are presented solely with the District Court’s legal conclusion 
to deny Bruce’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which we 
shall review de novo.  Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
432 F.3d 235, 239 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005). 
IV 
This leads to the question whether Gary Bruce was 
convicted of conduct that is not a crime in light of Fowler.  It 
should be observed that we are venturing into something of a 
habeas corpus frontier, this being the first case in which this 
Court has considered the merits of an actual innocence claim 
under § 2241. 
A 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a prisoner 
can obtain habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence, having left the matter open time and again.  Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993); House v. Bell, 547 
U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006); District Attorney’s Office for Third 
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72 (2009).  That 
does not mean, however, that innocence is irrelevant: a 
prisoner’s proof of actual innocence may provide a gateway for 
federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted or untimely 
claims of constitutional error.  See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 
S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 (2013).  Bruce’s actual innocence claim 
does not come to us as a gateway issue.  He is not seeking to 
demonstrate his innocence so as to proceed with some 
otherwise defaulted or untimely claim, but to obtain full habeas 
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relief.  If Bruce were indeed asserting a freestanding actual 
innocence claim, “the threshold showing for such an assumed 
right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.”  Herrera, 506 
U.S. at 417. 
We need not resolve whether Bruce’s actual innocence 
claim is a freestanding one.  This Court’s precedent instructs 
that actual innocence claims under § 2241 are to be initially 
tested against the more relaxed (but still stringent) actual 
innocence gateway standard.  Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246.  To 
succeed under that standard, a petitioner must “demonstrate 
that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”  Bousley, 523 
U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In order “to 
balance the societal interests in finality . . . and conservation of 
scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice 
that arises in the extraordinary case,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298, 324 (1995), the gateway standard is purposefully 
“demanding” and was formulated to ensure that a successful 
petitioner’s case is “truly extraordinary.”  House, 547 U.S. at 
537-38 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (cautioning that “tenable actual-
innocence gateway pleas are rare”).  A petitioner can meet this 
standard “by demonstrating an intervening change in law that 
rendered his conduct non-criminal.”  Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246.  
Failure to meet the gateway standard is sufficient to reject any 
hypothetical freestanding actual innocence claim.  Albrecht v. 
Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir. 2007); see also House, 547 
U.S. at 555 (noting that a freestanding actual innocence claim 
would require “more convincing proof of innocence” than that 
needed to meet the gateway standard). 
Because “‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, 
not mere legal insufficiency,” the Government “is not limited 
to the existing record to rebut any showing that [the] petitioner 
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may make.”  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24.  A habeas court is 
therefore “not bound by the rules of admissibility that would 
govern at trial,” but must instead “make its determination ‘in 
light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been 
illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of 
it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly 
excluded or to have become available only after the trial.’”  
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)).  With this 
broader array of evidence in view, the district court does not 
exercise its “independent judgement as to whether reasonable 
doubt exists”; rather, the actual innocence standard “requires 
the district court to make a probabilistic determination about 
what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.”  Id. at 
329.  And it must be presumed, moreover, that a reasonable 
juror “would consider fairly all of the evidence presented” and 
“conscientiously obey the instructions of the trial court 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  
After Fowler, a conviction for witness tampering 
murder requires the Government to prove: (1) the defendant 
killed or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant was 
motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between 
any person and law enforcement authorities concerning the 
commission or possible commission of an offense; (3) that 
offense was actually a federal offense; and (4) a reasonable 
likelihood that the person whom the defendant believes may 
communicate with law enforcement would in fact make a 
relevant communication with a federal law enforcement 
officer.  Tyler, 732 F.3d at 252.  Bruce’s actual innocence claim 
focuses solely on the reasonable likelihood element. 
Establishing a reasonable likelihood requires 
“evidence—not merely argument of the witness’s cooperation 
23 
 
with law enforcement.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The statute nevertheless reaches conduct that “takes place 
before the victim has engaged in any communication at all with 
law enforcement officers—at a time when the precise 
communication and nature of the officer who may receive it 
are not yet known.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 673.  And in this 
regard, the Government “need not prove that a federal 
investigation was in progress at the time the defendant 
committed a witness-tampering offense.”  Tyler, 732 F.3d at 
252 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  Nor must 
the Government show that such a communication, “had it 
occurred, would have been federal beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 678.  The Government need only 
show that “the likelihood of communication to a federal officer 
was more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.”  Id.  
This is a “relatively low bar.”  Smith, 723 F.3d at 518.   
Of course, the bar is low for the Government at trial.  
“Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted 
of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of 
innocence disappears.”  Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399; see also 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326 n.42 (A habeas petition asserting an 
actual innocence claim “comes before the habeas court with a 
strong—and in the vast majority of the cases conclusive—
presumption of guilt.”).  So the Government’s low bar is 
instead a high hurdle for Bruce.  Compounded with the 
extraordinary showing needed to establish his innocence, 
Bruce’s burden of proof is a heavy one. 
B 
Applying these principles, we now address whether it is 
more likely than not that any reasonable juror would have 
reasonable doubt that Gary Bruce killed Danny Vine and Della 
Thornton to prevent them from communicating with a federal 
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law enforcement officer.  Three sets of considerations to be 
discussed demonstrate why, in our view, Bruce cannot make 
this extraordinary showing. 
First, Bruce’s robbery and arson were undisputed 
federal offenses.  Vine ran an interstate shell buying business 
out of his home.  The mussel shells that Bruce and his cohorts 
stole were later sold in Kentucky.  And the ATF has authority 
to investigate suspicious fires at commercial locations, see 18 
U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and 846, as it eventually did in this very case. 
To be sure, “when a defendant acts in ways that violate 
state criminal law, some or all of those acts will violate federal 
criminal law as well.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 676.  Fowler gave 
the enforcement of marijuana offenses as an example of 
federal-state overlap.  Id. at 677.  But the armed robbery and 
arson of an interstate business is a far cry from a marijuana 
offense and even further afield from being a crime that would 
raise significant federalism concerns.  The Fowler Court 
“certainly did not suggest that, when other evidence 
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of communication with 
a federal officer, the fact that the underlying crime could have 
been prosecuted under both state and federal law precluded 
prosecution under” the witness tampering murder statute.  
United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 498 (4th Cir. 
2012); see also United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 
2015) (noting in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), the 
materially identical witness tampering statute, that “the very 
fact that communication with federal officials took place 
months after [the defendant’s] solicitations lends some support 
to a finding that the communications were reasonably likely at 
the time of the solicitations”).    
Furthermore, the fact that a federal investigation 
ultimately occurred after Vine and Thornton’s murder is 
probative evidence of the likelihood that they would have 
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eventually communicated with a federal officer.  Had either 
survived, it is scarcely remote, outlandish, or simply 
hypothetical that they would have communicated with one of 
the FBI or ATF agents assigned to the investigation.  And to 
the extent TBI Special Agent Daniel and other Tennessee 
officers participated in the investigation after federal 
intervention, they too would count as federal officers.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4) (for purposes of the witness tampering 
murder statute a “law enforcement officer” includes “a person 
authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or 
serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant”). 
Bruce makes much of the two-year gap between the 
crime and the involvement of federal authorities.  He argues 
that Fowler requires “objective proof that federal involvement 
was reasonably likely at the time of the victim’s death,” and 
that this proof must be “particular to the victim.”  Bruce Br. 17 
(emphasis deleted).  But under Fowler temporal remoteness 
has to do with the degree of likelihood of federal involvement.  
Congress intended the statute to apply “where the defendant 
killed the victim before the victim had decided to communicate 
to law enforcement officers.”  Fowler, 568 U.S. at 676.  And 
here, the very reason for the two-year interval is exactly why 
federal involvement became necessary.   
That leads to the second consideration to be discussed.  
The record from Bruce’s trial confirms that, consistent with the 
Bruce family’s long-held history of violence, their campaign 
of fear and witness intimidation stymied the state investigation, 
making federal intervention essential.  Indeed, Bruce admitted 
as much while detained pre-trial at the McNary County, 
Tennessee jail.  There, Gary and Jerry Bruce got to know a 
fellow inmate named James McGrogan.  The two brothers 
expressed to McGrogan their belief that they owned and ran 
Benton County and that “nobody was supposed to interfere 
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with them [or] their family.”  J.A. 694.  Were any witnesses to 
testify against the Bruces “they would be sorry.”  Id.  The 
brothers also explained how they hoped that “other members 
of their family would be able to frighten some people” so their 
case “would never come to trial.”  J.A. 701.  And just before 
Gary Bruce began his escape from the jail, “his last words were 
that there wouldn’t be any witnesses or their fucking families.”  
J.A. 708. 
Several key witnesses testified at Bruce’s trial that they 
were too scared to cooperate until the federal investigation 
began.  Ralph Sentell, Jr. owned the gas station where Gary, 
Jerry, and Robert Bruce filled several containers of gasoline 
the night of the murders.  Sentell initially did not cooperate 
with state investigators because, having known Gary Bruce for 
twenty years, he was scared of the Bruces’ “reputation and 
what they were capable of doing.”  J.A. 649-50.  After Sentell 
testified to the federal grand jury, Gary Bruce tried to 
intimidate Sentell by lingering around the gas station.  This 
scared Sentell, who began carrying a pistol and asked the FBI 
and TBI at least twenty times if he could be placed in a witness 
protection program. 
Patricia Odham hosted a party at her trailer the day 
before the murders.  It was there that Bruce and others agreed 
they would rob Vine’s shell camp.  Odham knew the Bruce 
family well and was afraid she would be killed if she 
cooperated with the investigation.  When Odham was first 
interviewed by Special Agent Daniel, she did not say anything 
about the party.  Despite this, suspicious things began 
happening at her property; after Odham had her then-boyfriend 
Mike Franklin speak to Bruce, the events stopped.  Odham 
eventually moved to Alabama with Franklin and did not 
cooperate until at least a year and a half after the murders. 
Ira Travis is a first cousin of the Bruces who has known 
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the family his entire life.   He was present when the robbery 
was planned at Odham’s trailer, but declined to participate in 
its execution.  Travis initially told Special Agent Daniel that he 
knew nothing.  Due to his familiarity with the Bruces and 
“what they do,” Travis feared for his and his family’s safety.  
J.A. 544.  He eventually fled Tennessee for nearly five years, 
and did not cooperate with authorities until he met with federal 
investigators in January 1996. 
Tammy Rayburn was offered money from Robert Bruce 
to supply an alibi for the murders.  Rayburn, who had 
previously dated Robert, did not come forward with this 
information for several years because she was scared of the 
Bruces.  Rayburn’s fear was due in part to stalking by Kathleen 
Bruce, who would park her car next door to Rayburn’s house 
and stare at Rayburn. 
John Norrell saw David Riales speed away from Vine’s 
house in Vine’s truck the night of the murders.  Due to hearing 
“rumors of people being murdered and threatened,” Norrell did 
not approach the authorities with this information for a year 
and a half.  J.A. 751.  When Norrell learned of Gary Bruce’s 
pre-trial escape from jail, he feared for his life and considered 
entering a witness protection program.  He was instead given 
$4,000 from the FBI to move out of state. 
Other testimony from Bruce’s trial detailed the Bruce 
family’s efforts to intimidate witnesses.  Shannon Irwin was 
dating Robert Bruce at the time of the murders and later 
married Jerry Bruce.  After Special Agent Daniel interviewed 
Irwin, Kathleen Bruce began to follow her around town.  Later, 
Gary Bruce told Irwin that “he could kill [Irwin] and his 
momma right there and it would never be on his conscience.”  
J.A. 789-90.   
Wayne Decker spoke with Special Agent Daniel after 
the federal grand jury investigation started.  Decker had known 
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the Bruces for more than thirty years.  After observing Daniel 
serve Decker with a subpoena, Gary and Robert Bruce 
confronted Decker.  Knowing “the way [the Bruces] operate 
and the way they live,” Decker lied to the Bruces about what 
he had told Daniel so as to not “put [himself] in danger.”  J.A. 
818, 822.   
Danny Vine’s father Larry Vine was also subject to the 
Bruces’ intimidation.  A couple months after the murders, Gary 
and Jerry Bruce ran Larry Vine off the road with their truck.  
Another time, Jerry Bruce cut Larry Vine off at an intersection 
and stared him down.  Other members of the Bruce family 
would make obscene gestures at Larry Vine anytime they saw 
him around Camden.   
Gary Bruce even threatened Special Agent Daniel.  
Prior to federal intervention, when Tennessee authorities 
executed a search warrant on Bruce’s property, Bruce made 
several violent taunts threatening to kill Daniel.  Among other 
things, Bruce told Daniel: “Had I known you were coming, I 
would have met you down the road with a rifle, and you would 
have never made it up on the property.”  J.A. 837. 
Third and finally, additional evidence outside of 
Bruce’s trial record confirms that federal involvement was 
necessary and inevitable.  Mike Franklin was present at 
Patricia Odham’s trailer when Bruce and others planned to rob 
Vine’s shell camp.  Franklin was dating Odham at the time and 
was close with Gary Bruce.   At the April 1995 trial of Bruce’s 
codefendants, he testified that he and Odham moved to 
Alabama because they were nervous about things in Benton 
County.  Franklin did not cooperate with authorities until he 
and Odham reached out to Special Agent Daniel about a year 
and a half after the murders.  Also at the 1995 trial, Ralph 
Sentell testified that Gary Bruce tried to intimidate him into 
lying about whether the Bruces bought gas at Sentell’s station 
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the night of the murders.  And ATF Special Agent Mark 
Teufert likewise explained that, despite efforts from authorities 
in multiple states, Ira Travis could not be located in time for 
the 1995 trial. 
At Jerry Bruce’s September 1994 bond hearing, Benton 
County sheriff’s deputy Robert Weller testified about the 
Bruce family’s reputation.  He detailed how the Bruces 
attempted to intimidate Special Agent Daniel to “slow up the 
possibility of gaining new evidence.”  J.A. 181.  Weller also 
explained that “[i]t’s hard to investigate the family” because 
sheriff’s deputies were “scared of them.”  J.A. 194, 201.  For 
local law enforcement, the approach was: “If you’re going to 
stop a Bruce, make sure you have backup.  If you’re going to 
call, make sure you have somebody else with you.  And, 
generally, if you don’t have to mess with them, don’t mess with 
them.”  J.A. 176. 
The federal nature of Bruce’s crimes, the evidence 
produced by the Government at his trial, and additional record 
evidence all clearly establish that the Bruce family had a long-
standing history of violence that was well-known to members 
of the community before the murders.  The Bruces’ reputation 
manifested itself later as witnesses were intimidated from 
cooperating until after federal authorities became involved.  
Much of the evidence in this case consists of post-offense acts 
of Gary Bruce and his codefendants that demonstrate a 
continuous plan to avoid prosecution for the events of January 
16, 1991.  These facts defeat Bruce’s present assertion that the 
two-year interval between the murders and the involvement of 
federal authorities undermines the reasonable likelihood that 
Vine and Thornton would have made a “relevant 
communication with a federal law enforcement officer.”  Tyler, 
732 F.3d at 252.  It should be noted, however, that post-offense 
acts are appropriately considered here given the wide-open 
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evidentiary universe that attends this actual innocence 
proceeding.  While evidence of post-offense acts can certainly 
be relevant to any reasonable likelihood determination, the 
weight of such evidence may present a different question at 
trial, when constraints on the admissibility of evidence are in 
play.  That question is not considered in this case. 
In sum, the Court holds that any reasonable juror faced 
with “‘all the evidence,’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328 (quoting 
Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 160), would conclude that, had 
Danny Vine and Della Thornton survived, the likelihood that 
they would have communicated with a federal officer was 
more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.  It 
therefore follows that any reasonable juror would convict 
Bruce of witness tampering murder.   
* * * 
Charles Gary Bruce has now been afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate his innocence in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fowler.  For the reasons 
stated, that is an extraordinary showing he cannot make.  The 
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
